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Growth and Regional Integration: The Case of
the Southern African Development
Community
Chris Mupimpilaa and Patricia Funjikab
aUniversity of Botswana and bUniversity of Zambia
The neoclassical growth model is augmented with structural variables to analyse
the determinants of economic growth in the Southern African Development
Community. The results show that physical capital, exports, infrastructure, and
human capital have a positive and significant effect on economic growth. However,
inflation and external debt service have a negative but significant impact on
economic growth in the region. In addition, the results suggest that the
underdevelopment of the financial sector is a source of heterogeneity among
member countries. Therefore, to promote growth and deeper integration in the
region, it is necessary to address the underlying causes of inflation, debt, and the
underdevelopment of the financial sector.
1. Introduction
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional grouping of
fifteen countries in Southern Africa. The SADC considers regional integration to be
a channel for enhanced development among the member countries. For this
purpose, the organisation has adopted macroeconomic indicators for stability and
convergence, such as inflation and the ratio of the government budget deficit to
the gross domestic product (GDP). Studies that have analysed macroeconomic
stability and convergence in SADC show that some countries have achieved the
targets while others have not (Chipeta and Schade, 2007; Tabengwa and Salkin,
2006). Other studies have focused on the comparative and institutional aspects
of regional integration in SADC (Hansohm, et al., 2005; Clapham, et. al., 2001).
However, there are still unanswered questions on the sources of economic growth
in the region. What factors determine growth in SADC? Answers to these
questions can help SADC set priorities for the future. Besides, it is now evident
that economic growth induces deeper regional integration. In the past, there was
a recurrent view that regional integration stimulates rapid economic growth.
Evidence now shows the opposite to be true; that rapid economic growth is a
precursor to advanced regional integration (Tjonneland, 2005; Chinsinga, 2002;
Mills and Sidiropoulos, 2001; Mutschler, 2001). 
This article analyses the factors which determine economic growth in SADC.
The article is organized as follows: section 2 presents background information
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about the objectives and institutions of SADC. Section 3 provides an outline of
the model and data sources. The results of the study are analyzed in section 4.
Finally we present a summary and conclusions of the article in section 5. 
2. SADC Objectives and Institutions
SADC is the successor to the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC), which was initiated by the then Front Line States, namely:
Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (Rangasamy et. al., 2000;
Ostergaard, 1990; Hanlon, 1984). These countries were known as Front Line
States for two reasons. First, the countries were in close proximity to apartheid
South Africa. Second, they were united in their support for the independence of
Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Besides, the
Front Line States were economically heavily dependent on South Africa for
transport and communications, and trade and investment. To counter the
challenge posed by the Front Line States, South Africa, in the late 1970s,
attempted to create its own regional grouping, the so-called “Constellation of
Southern African States” or “CONSAS.”
In 1979, the Front Line States held a conference in Arusha, Tanzania, which
was a prelude to the formation of the SADCC. In April 1980, heads of government
and representatives from nine Southern African countries met in Lusaka, Zambia,
to launch the SADCC. The original members were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The principal
objectives of the SADCC were to reduce dependence on South Africa and to
secure external funding for regional projects. 
The SADCC was governed by a Summit of heads of state, a Council of
Ministers, a Standing Committee of officials and a Secretariat, based in Gaborone,
Botswana. The SADCC’s Programme of Action was implemented through
economic sectors which were assigned to member countries to coordinate.
However, the organization considered transport and communications to be the
main priority, because the region acutely depended on South Africa in this sector.
In retrospect, it has been noted that the SADCC succeeded in securing
external funding, in sustaining the international campaign against apartheid, and
in inculcating a sense of regional identity among its member countries
(Rangasamy et. al., 2000; Ostergaard, 1990). However, the main failures of the
SADCC were on lessening dependency on South Africa and on external funding.
Furthermore, the SADCC was a competitor to the Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
for Eastern and Southern Africa. Several members of the SADCC were also
members of the PTA. Attempts to address these problems led to the restructuring
of the organization in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Southern African
Development Community (SADC) was established, in August 1992, as the
successor to the SADCC.
Unlike its predecessor, SADC was formed by a treaty, which gave it legal
status. In addition, SADC was established mainly to promote regional integration
in Southern Africa. This was in accordance with the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action
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and the 1991 Abuja Treaty. In 1994, South Africa became a multiparty democracy
with the ascendance to majority rule and joined SADC. Mauritius joined the
regional bloc in 1995. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Seychelles
joined in 1997. Over time, the membership of SADC grew; by 2010, there were
fifteen countries, namely; Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
SADC retained the administrative structure of the SADCC. The member
countries that joined the organization after the restructuring were given new sector
responsibilities. Thus, for instance, South Africa, upon joining in 1994, was
assigned the Finance and Investment portfolio. In 1996, the SADC Organ on
Politics, Security and Defense Cooperation was established. The Organ was
established in order to deal with political and security issues affecting SADC. By
the year 2000, SADC countries had signed 11 protocols, seven of which were
ratified by member countries (Rangasamy, 2001:35). Those that were ratified and
are at the stage of implementation are the protocols on: Immunities and Privileges,
Shared Water Course Systems, Energy, Transport, Communications and
Meteorology, Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking, Trade and Mining. 
In 2001, SADC was restructured by ending the system of sectoral project and co-
coordinating units, which by then were twenty-one, and were scattered among SADC
member countries (Tjonneland, 2005). By the reforms of 2001, the units and
commissions were closed down and consolidated into four clusters known as
directorates. These are run by the SADC Secretariat. The four directorates are: trade
and investment, infrastructure and services, food and agriculture, and human
development and special programmes. In 2003, SADC issued two new strategic
plans: the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP); and the Strategic
Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation (SIPO).
According to the RISDP, SADC should be a free trade area by 2008, a customs union
by 2010 and a common market by 2015 (SADC, 2003:115). SADC also aspires to
form a Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) with the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC) by 2012. The
TFTA will have trade and tariff implications for member countries in all the three blocs.
It also changes SADC’s internal vision as laid out in the RISDP. Overall, the objective
of the RISDP is the integration of SADC into the global economy through: “increased
SADC share of trade and investment in total global trade and investment; increased
SADC trade and investment with other regional economic blocs,” (SADC, 2003: 115).
The extent to which SADC can integrate into the world economy through trade and
investment depends on the degree to which SADC grows. Therefore, it is necessary
to know the factors which determine growth in SADC.
3. Model Specification and Variables
We are motivated by a neoclassical production function. We postulate a
production function (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2002; Mankiw et al., 1992; Chenery
et. al., 1986) of the form:
Growth and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African
Development Community
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Yit = (Lit, Kit, Xit)
i = 1, ..., N;  t = 1, ..., T (1)
where i denotes countries and t denotes time. In this case,  Yit is real output
per capita in country i at time t. Lit and Kit are the conventional neoclassical growth
variable labour and capital inputs, respectively. Xit is a vector of structural
variables. The specific estimated equation is:
GDPit = β0 + β1LFit + βGFCFit + EXPit + LEit + INFRAit + SEit + DEDTSit + INFLit
+ IRit + MONit + DCit + μit (2)
where GDPit is real GDP per capita and Lit is total labour force. The variable
GFCFi is real gross fixed capital formation. This is the capital input. The structural
variables are: real exports (EXPit), life expectancy at birth (LEit), infrastructure
(INFRAit), secondary school enrollment as percent of total enrollment (SEit), total
debt service on external debt (DEDTSit), inflation (INFLit), real interest rate (IRit),
money supply (M2) as percent of GDP (MONit) and domestic credit provided by
the banking sector as a percent of GDP (DCit) and μit is the error term. As indicated
earlier, when the SADCC was formed in 1980, it gave priority to transport and
communications, in order to reduce its dependency on South Africa. Thus, in the
present study, three types of infrastructure are used: paved roads as percent of
total roads, telephone lines per 100 people, and mobile and fixed line subscribers
per 100 people. The data for the study was obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators for 2009. This was pooled across the 15 SADC countries
over the period 1990 to 2007. This formed a panel dataset of 270 observations.
4. Empirical Results
The empirical model in equation 2 was estimated by panel data estimation, the
advantages of which are well documented (Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 1985). The
approach enables us to test for heterogeneity among SADC member countries,
given that the countries differ in geographical size, income, population, etc. The
approach also increases the degrees of freedom and gives a better understanding
of empirical issues than the use of time series or cross sectional data separately.
The study used Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and Panel Least
Squares (PLS). The results of the regressions are in tables 1 to 4. In the case of
the pooled cross sections, we had to determine whether the fixed effects (FE) or
random effects (RE) model is supported by the data. We used the Likelihood ratio
test for fixed effects and the Hausman (1978) test for random effects. The
empirical results are depicted in the tables. Columns 1 and 2 in table 1 show
results for the fixed effects model. Columns 3 and 4 in table 2 show the results for
the random effects model.
Chris Mupimpila and Patricia Funjika
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Table 1: Determinants of Economic Growth in SADC: Fixed Effects Model
(Pooled OLS, 1990 – 2007)
Dependant Variable (rgdppc) 1 2
Coef t Coef t
Constant 4.290 0.468 6.837 0.761
Labour force (lftot) -0.507 -0.710 -0.484 -0.669
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (rgfcf) 0.181 1.107 0.096
0.660
Roads, paved % of total roads -0.005 -1.496 -0.003 -1.156
(infra2)
School Enrolment, Secondary (Sesec) 0.014** 3.623 0.015** 3.894
Real Exports (rexp) 0.206 1.077 0.174 0.910
Life Expectancy at Birth (lexp) 0.003 0.524 0.0007 0.137
Debt Service on External Debt, total current US$ (Debtservice) 0.065 1.064 0.043 0.739
Inflation (%) (inflationcp) 0.099 1.041 0.058
0.653
Mobile and Fixed line telephone subscribers per 100 (infra1) 0.002 0.625 0.002 0.667
Domestic Credit by Banking Sector (Doms) 0.003 1.095
Money and Quasi Money (M2) as % of GDP (mqmy) -0.010 -1.565 -0.005 -1.106
Real Interest Rate (rinr) 0.003 0.849 0.002 -0.798
Adj. R-Squared 0.99 0.99
D-W Statistic 1.29 0.70
F-Statistic 512.55 523.89
N 30 30
Cross sections included 11 11
Notes: * indicates 10% confidence level and ** indicates 1% and 5 % confidence levels.
The result in table 1 and 2 show clearly that it is the inclusion or exclusion of
financial sector variables that supports the fixed or random effects model. The
financial sector variables used in the study are: domestic credit provided by the
banking sector as a percentage of GDP, money and quasi-money (M2) as a
percentage of GDP, and real interest rate. Although these variables are statistically
insignificant, their inclusion as regressors, in columns 1 and 2 in table 1 reveals
that SADC member countries have unique features or characteristics. The
countries are heterogeneous (the fixed effects model). In their analysis of ten
SADC countries, Chipeta and Schade (2007: 21), state that, “… despite [the]
widespread commitment to similar, relatively orthodox macroeconomic and trade
policies, widely divergent macroeconomic and economic conditions prevail across
the ten countries.” How can we explain this lack of convergence in SADC? 
Growth and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African
Development Community
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Table 2: Determinants of Economic Growth in SADC: Random Effects Model 
(Pooled OLS, 1990-2007)
Dependant Variable (rgdppc) 3 4
Coef t Coef t
Constant 0.139 0.301 -0.594 -0.809
Labour force (lftot) -0.602** -16.347 -0.652** -12.05
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (rgfcf) 0.285** 7.287 0.335** 5.717
Roads, paved % of total roads -0.002 1.697 0.001 0.937
(infra2)
School Enrolment, Secondary (Sesec) 0.006** 2.755 0.002 0.670
Real Exports (rexp) 0.446** 17.020 0.467** 12.438
Life Expectancy at Birth (lexp) -0.004 -1..519 -0.002 -0.498
Debt Service on External Debt, total current US$ (Debtservice) 0.053 1.658 0.060 1.324
Inflation (%) (inflationcp) -0.001** -2.142 -0.0006 -0.769
Mobile and Fixed line telephone subscribers per 100 (infra1) 0.003** 2.215
Telephone lines per 100 people (infra4) 0.003 1.014
Adj. R-Squared 0.99 0.99
D-W Statistic 0.41 0.59
F-Statistic 262.43 293.67
N 23 23
Cross sections included 10 10
Notes: * indicates 10% confidence level and ** indicates 1% and 5 % confidence levels.
In the 1980s and 1990s, SADC succeeded in attracting substantial development
finance from industrialized countries. The resources were used, among others, for
regional projects in infrastructure. During that time, SADC had more than 21 sector
co-ordination units in the 12 member countries (see section 2). However, as noted
by Tjonneland (2005), the projects implemented by the units were national and not
regional in scope. They, therefore, did not have a regional impact. The units also
suffered from inertia and blurred vision. It can, therefore, be argued that SADC lost
two decades when external finance was much more accessible than in recent times,
but little progress was made to implement regional development programmes. Thus,
by the reforms of 2001, the 21 sector units and commissions were closed down and
consolidated into four clusters known as directorates, which are now run by the
SADC Secretariat. The 2001 reforms were aimed at making SADC adapt to changing
circumstances and problems. However, the reforms have not achieved their purpose
because of the constraints on the SADC Secretariat. The Secretariat is merely an
administrative institution, without the capacity or political power to force member
countries to comply with the SADC agenda. The new SADC Treaty of 1992 precludes
such power. Furthermore, the Secretariat does not have adequate capacity to
evaluate and monitor the implementation of SADC projects (Tjonneland, 2005). 
For these reasons, macroeconomic convergence is slower than expected.
Besides, the strength of SADC does not only depend on the Secretariat, but on
Chris Mupimpila and Patricia Funjika
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the strength of the constituent member countries as well. If member countries are
weak economically and politically, these weaknesses will be transmitted to SADC
as a whole. Although eleven protocols have been signed and seven have been
ratified, SADC countries differ in their capacities to implement the protocols and
agreements. Therefore, only a few of the protocols that are of practical value have
been implemented (Mills and Sidiropoulos, 2001). 
This article shows that the factor that is significant for economic growth in the
fixed effects model in SADC is human capital formation. This is represented by
secondary school enrolment. However, in the random effects model depicted in
table 2, columns 3 and 4, suggests that, apart from human capital formation, there
are other factors which significantly determine economic growth in SADC. These
are labour force, capital, exports, inflation and infrastructure. 
All these variables have the expected signs. All, except labour force and
inflation, have a positive effect on growth. The results show that inflation has a
significant but negative effect on economic growth in SADC. This is expected.
Inflation raises macroeconomic instability and reduces the attractiveness of the
investment climate in the region. This is particularly so when we consider that
inflation in Zimbabwe has, in recent years, been the highest in the world, with a
record of 1,593% in January 2007 (The Zimbabwean, 2007:5). 
The Zimbabwean experience has been employed by some analysts to
illustrate the impact of instability on regional integration. According to Mills and
Sidiropoulos (200: 2), there is a paradox in regional integration. Regional stability
requires that member countries be integrated deeply, but this in itself increases the
degree to which the countries transmit instability to one another. The paradox is
that, while deeper integration is necessary for stability, it also increases the
transmission of instability. When member countries are well integrated, the
instability that occurs in one country rapidly spreads elsewhere in the regional
bloc. This point has been succinctly stated by Cleary (2001:95):
Conflict, as the contagion effect of recent events in Zimbabwe makes
clear, has deleterious effects on global investor confidence outside the
narrow confines of the country in which it occurs. When conflict is
widespread – as it is in Africa – those with no driving economic interest
in distinguishing one polity from another, will tend, as we have seen
recently, to generalize sweepingly.
Thus, while convergence and deeper integration are noble goals, these
processes also generate negative externalities. The results of the pooled
regressions in this article show that when SADC countries exhibit the same
characteristics of homogeneity, there are more factors that are significant for
economic growth than under conditions of heterogeneity. To the degree that it
reduces heterogeneity among member countries, macroeconomic convergence
should be growth promoting in SADC. The results of the study suggest that
financial sector variables are a source of heterogeneity among SADC member
countries. Convergence in the financial sector is, therefore, necessary for growth.
This is especially so when we consider the ‘contagion effect’ of instability (Cleary,
Growth and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African
Development Community
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2001) and its negative externalities (Mills and Sidiropoulos, 2001).
Tables 3 and 4 depict the results of Panel Least Squares (PLS). As is the
case with other studies, we conducted panel unit root tests using different criteria.
We incorporate the individual effects and the individual and trend effects. The tests
conducted showed evidence of non-stationarity of the variables in levels. One of
the ways of dealing with variables that are non-stationary at levels is to investigate
the co-integration relationship between the variables (Hatanaka, 1996; Engle and
Granger, 1987). Therefore, the Pedroni panel co-integration test was conducted
(Baltagi, 2005; Hsiao, 1985). All the Pedroni panel test statistics reject the null
hypothesis of no co-integration.1
Table 3: Determinants of Economic Growth in SADC 
(Panel OLS, 1990-2007)
Dependant Variable (rgdppc) 1 2
Coef t Coef t
Constant -1.802 -1.247 -0.696 -0.923
Labour force (lftot) -0.460** -5.548 -0.525** -7.911
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (rgfcf) 0.265** 2.87 0.368**
5.695
Roads, paved % of total roads -0.002 0.775 0.002 0.919
(infra2)
School Enrolment, Secondary (Sesec) 0.010** 2.842 0.008** 2.948
Real Exports (rexp) 0.486** 10.15 0.463** 9.747
Life Expectancy at Birth (lexp) 0.299 1.055 0.007 1.416
Debt Service on External Debt, total current US$ (Debtservice) -0.120* -2.077 -0.167** -3.576
Inflation (%) (inflationcp) -0.0006 -0.0003 0.001
0.647
Telephone lines per 100 people Iinfra4) -0.006 -0.824
Domestic Credit by Banking Sector (Doms) -0.002 -1.628
Money and Quasi Money (M2) as % of GDP (mqmy) 0.004 1.002 -0.001 -0.701
Real Interest Rate (rinr) 0.003 0.624 0.005 1.235
Adj. R-Squared 0.99 0.99
D-W Statistic 2.65 2.69
F-Statistic 472.94 525.49
N 22 22
Cross sections included 10 10
Notes:
̃ Regression with financial sector variables.
* indicates 10% confidence level and ** indicates 1% and 5 % confidence levels.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 3 show the panel regression results with the financial
sector variables included. Columns 3 and 4 in table 4 show the effects of excluding
the financial sector variables. Evidently, the exclusion of financial sector variables
165
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is immaterial in the case of panel estimation, unlike the pooled regressions. This
outcome suggests that when analysing growth factors, the estimation procedure
matters. This is besides the regressors used in the procedure. In other words, it
helps to analyse a problem by using different econometric techniques. Granted
this approach, in itself, poses its own problems. As is clear from tables 3 and 4,
panel results shed additional insight on the growth factors in SADC. 
Table 4: Determinants of Economic Growth in SADC
(Panel OLS, 1990-2007)
Dependant Variable (rgdppc) 3 4
Coef t Coef t
Constant 0.133 0.084 -0.309 -0.176
Labour force (lftot) -0.444** -4.713 -0.497** -4.770
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (rgfcf) 0.336** 3.976 0.362** 4.09
Roads, paved % of total roads 0.005** 2.052 0.004 1.696
(infra2)
School Enrolment, Secondary (Sesec) 0.010** 2.332 0.008 1.475
Real Exports (rexp) 0.408** 7.602 0.426** 7.652
Life Expectancy at Birth (lexp) 0.014 0.046 0.035 0.112
Debt Service on External Debt, total current US$ (Debtservice) -0.165** -2.674 -0.147** -2.255
Inflation (%) (inflationcp) -0.001 -1.208 -0.001 -0.864
Mobile and Fixed line telephone subscribers per 100 people (infra1) 0.007 0.341
Telephone lines per 100 people Iinfra4) -0.003 -0.504
Adj. R-Squared 0.99 0.99
D-W Statistic 1.53 1.4
F-Statistic 393.66 389.55
N 23 22
Cross sections included 10 10
Notes:
Regression without financial sector variables.
* indicates 10% confidence level and ** indicates 1% and 5 % confidence levels.
The results from the pooled and panel estimations show that labour force,
capital and exports are significant for economic growth in SADC The pooled
results in tables 1 and 2 also show that inflation has a significant but negative
effect on growth. On the other hand, the panel results, in tables 3 and 4 have two
additional factors that are significant for growth in SADC. These are infrastructure
and debt service on external debt. Infrastructure is measured by paved roads as
percent of total roads. Table 4, column 3 shows that paved roads are significant
while all the four regressions in tables 3 and 4 show that debt service has a
significant but negative effect on growth in SADC. 
The number of paved roads as a percent of total roads is found to have a
positive and significant impact on growth in SADC. This finding is important in light
of the fact that from its inception in the 1980s SADC gave priority to transport and
Growth and Regional Integration: The Case of the Southern African
Development Community
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communications. This was in order to reduce its dependency on South Africa
during the apartheid era. The fact that paved roads are positively and significantly
related to growth in SADC suggests that the organization should value the
investment in good roads. Poor infrastructure is considered to be one of the
supply-side constraints to regional integration in SADC because it makes the
transport network very costly. According to Mills and Sidiropoulos (2001: 6)
transport costs account for more than 30% of the consumer prices for imports into
SADC and for most of the goods produced in the region. Since these are reflected
in the sales price, it is the case that transport costs are shifted forward to
consumers, and as such, they are a hidden tax to consumers.
Furthermore, high transport costs retard intra-regional trade in SADC. It has
often been said that intra-regional trade in SADC is very low. This is as compared
to that of the other regional blocs, such as the Southern Common Market
(Mercosur)2 and the Andean Community (CAN)3 in South America (Meyn, 2005;
Chinsinga, 2002; Gibb, 2001; Mutschler, 2001). Intra-regional trade in SADC has,
through the years, been estimated to be at 6% of total trade among member
countries (Meyn, 2005; Rangasamy, 2000). Trade among SADC countries is low
because the countries produce identical products. They, therefore, lack product
complementarities. SADC countries are either mineral-based or rural-agrarian
economies which are not diversified. The countries have low levels of
industrialisation. They mainly depend on the export of primary commodities and
the import of manufactured goods. Furthermore, intra-regional trade in SADC is
retarded by a host of supply-side constraints, such as poor roads and unreliable
services for water and electricity (Meyn, 2005; Chinsinga, 2002). South Africa,
which has a diversified economy and comprises over 70% of SADC’s GDP, is an
exception (Mutscher, 2001:151).
The panel results in tables 3 and 4 show that debt service on external debt
has a significant but negative effect on economic growth in SADC. This is as
expected. Several SADC countries are in the category of highly-indebted
countries. As a result, the countries spend considerable amounts of their export
earnings to service the external debt. The opportunity cost of debt service includes
forgone investment in health and education. 
External debt service has other adverse effects on the economy. First, a
significant part of the country’s export earnings are spent on the repayment of the
external debt. In the case of Africa, “approximately one of every four dollars earned
is paid to service this debt” (Rampel, 1992:1). Secondly, the roots of the structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) implemented by these countries can be traced to
the African debt crisis. It is because of the debt crisis that the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank found it necessary to impose the
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on these countries. In turn, the SAPs
have worsened poverty and unemployment. Thirdly, as a result of the world debt
crisis, the IMF and the World Bank initiated, in 1996, a debt relief programme to
40 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Of the 40 countries, 29 are in Sub-
Saharan Africa and six are in SADC.4 However, it can be argued that HIPC debt
Chris Mupimpila and Patricia Funjika
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relief is a palliative and not a panacea. This is because of the stringent IMF and
World Bank conditions in the programme. Furthermore, the savings from HIPC
may be misused because money is fungible (Shah, 2001). The findings of this
article are in line with the general view that external debt has a negative effect on
growth.
This article also supports the view that improvements in human capital and
economic growth are positively correlated. “Of all endowments, human capital
probably does most to fuel long-term economic gains,” (World Bank, 1994:5).
Several studies have found a positive and significant relationship between human
capital and economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Krueger and Lindahl,
2001; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Benhabid and Spiegel, 1994; Mankiw et al., 1992;
Lucas, 1988). Mankiw et al. (1992) augmented the Solow growth model by
including secondary school enrollment as the proxy for human capital formation.
They considered three groups of countries: non-oil low-income, intermediate and
OECD countries. Their results show that human capital accumulation is significant
for growth in all the three groups of countries. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) also
used aggregate cross-country data to examine the role of human capital in
economic development. They observe that human capital accumulation is
significant for development because it facilitates technological adoption and
innovation. Meanwhile, Easterlin (1981) asked the question: why isn’t the whole
world developed? In searching for answers to this question, Easterlin observed
that the development of North America and Europe was generated by the diffusion
of modern industrial technology in these countries. He, however, noted that the
application of modern technology was preceded by massive investments in formal
education, which later on made it possible to copy and apply modern technology.
Going a step further, Ehrlich (2007) asked the question: why did the United States
of America (USA) overtake Europe and become the economic superpower in the
20th century? He found that, compared to Europe, the USA had superior mass
higher education, which helped it to overtake Europe. Simply stated, investment
in human capital is good for economic growth.
This is confirmed in a study by Oketch (2006). Oketch‘s study looked at a
sample of 47 countries. This included all SADC members except Namibia. The
study established a positive and significant relationship between investment in
human capital and economic growth. Case studies on SADC member countries
report similar findings (Mupimpila, 2009, 2007a, 2007b; Siphambe, 2000; Ncube,
1999). In the present study both the pooled and panel results show that human
capital has a positive and significant impact on economic growth in SADC. 
Human capital formation also helps to explain the apparent paradox in the
growth experience of African countries (World Bank, 1994). Accumulated evidence
shows that per capita incomes and living standards fell in many African countries
during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. For most SADC countries, real per capita
incomes were lower at the beginning of the 21st century than in 1970
(Rangasamy, 2001:34). The paradox is that despite the fall in per capita incomes
and living standards, Africa showed improvements in human capital. School
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enrollments increased while the health and nutrition status showed improvements.
According to the World Bank (1994), this paradox can be explained by the fact that
human development was slowing down the protracted decline in economic
conditions. The value of the investment in human capital is that, when
circumstances allow, it stimulates growth, but in adverse conditions, it slows the
downward spiral. The present study confirms the critical role of human capital in
economic growth. 
Growth can induce deeper regional integration, provided SADC addresses two
perennial problems which sap the energy of the organization. First, SADC suffers
from a redundant and moribund development strategy. In their study of 10 SADC
countries, Chipeta and Schade (2007) found that in all but one country (Tanzania),
economic growth and development targets are, for the most part, set without
considering SADC priorities. In central and eastern SADC countries, the targets are
formulated with the aid of the IMF and World Bank, and donor countries. Thus, with
regards to growth and development targets, the regional development plan, the
RISDP, is redundant and moribund. SADC countries should set their growth and
development targets in the context of the regional agenda.
Second, SADC had, until recently, been a competitor to COMESA; particularly in
the areas of trade and investment. SADC and COMESA have overlapping
membership. Eight SADC member countries are also COMESA members.5 SADC
and COMESA have similar mandates, objectives and programmes. They both intend
to create a customs union. Besides, there is already a customs union within SADC,
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)6 . Therefore, the proposed TFTA
between COMESA, EAC and SADC will obviously have significant implications on
the economic growth of SADC, should the TFTA be implemented as planned. The
proposal for the TFTA was the result of a joint summit held by COMESA, EAC and
SADC in Kampala in 2008. It was decided that the three regional economic
communities should be merged into one regional economic community. A free trade
area should thereafter be established, to be followed by a customs union. It is
expected that the FTA Agreement will be signed by member states in July 2011 and
will be launched in January 2012. If it is effected, the TFTA will “…comprise 26
countries with a combined population of 527 million people, a combined GDP of US
$ 624 billion, a GDP per capita averaging US $1,118 and make up half the African
Union (AU) in terms of membership and just over 58% in terms of contribution to GDP
and 57% of the total population of the African Union,” (EAC, 2011:.1). Clearly, the
TFTA could be a catalyst for economic growth in SADC, because of the wider market
within the TFTA and the unity of purpose in one large regional economic community.
Besides, the SADC region has, in recent years, recorded positive growth rates. The
issue, therefore, is how to sustain the positive growth rates and raise them over time. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This article analysed the determinants of economic growth in SADC. We used the
neoclassical production function, which was augmented by structural variables.
These were real exports, life expectancy at birth, infrastructure, secondary school
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enrollment, total debt service on external debt, inflation, real interest rate, money
supply, and domestic credit provided by the banking sector. Pooled and panel
estimation yield contrasting results in some cases, but similar results in others. 
In the case of pooled cross sections, both fixed and random effects models are
supported by the data, depending on the variables included in the estimation. The
inclusion of financial sector variables is what supports the fixed effects model, while
the exclusion of these variables yields the random effects model. In the fixed effects
model, the factor that is significant for economic growth in SADC is human capital.
However, the random effects model shows that other factors, together with human
capital accumulation (SEit), significantly determine economic growth in SADC.
These factors are: labour force (Lit), physical capital (GFCFit), exports (EXPit),
inflation (INFLit), and infrastructure (INFRAit). It is important to note the difference
between human capital accumulation and labour force. One is about improvements
in the quality of the labour force while the other is the number of employed and
unemployed people actively seeking jobs. In the Solow growth model, an increase
in population growth rate increases the labour force and lowers the steady-state
capital-labour ratio. This results in a lower output per worker (Romer, 2006; Mankiw,
1997; Abel and Bernanke, 1995). This is considered to be the case in developing
countries where there are high rates of population growth. Therefore, in the article,
the negative but significant relationship between economic growth and labour force
is not surprising. SADC consists of developing countries that are sub-divided into
two groups (Mutschler, 2001). There are middle income countries with an annual
per capita income of above US $1,0017 and low income countries8 . Thus, in this
study, the pooled results suggest that the variables included or excluded in
estimation matter in the growth analysis of SADC countries.
By contrast, the panel results show that the inclusion or exclusion of financial
sector variables does not matter. Therefore, empirical results depend on both the
estimation procedure and the variables used in the estimation. Furthermore, the
panel results show that two additional factors are significant for growth in SADC.
These are infrastructure and debt service on external debt. As expected, paved
roads and economic growth are positively correlated, while external debt service,
like inflation, has a negative and significant impact on growth in SADC. This result
confirms the general view that external debt service has a negative effect on
growth. 
Our analysis of the pooled and panel results shows that the factors that retard
macroeconomic convergence in SADC are inflation and debt service on external
debt. We should also add the underdevelopment of the financial sector as a
constraint. The results of this study show that none of the financial sector variables
are positively correlated to growth in SADC. M2 as a percent of GDP shows the
extent to which the financial sector is well-developed (World Bank, 1994:25). Yet,
in our study, this variable is insignificant for growth in SADC. The
underdevelopment of the financial sector in SADC may be a microcosm of the
problems of SADC. Chipeta and Schade (2007) have shown that, in almost all
SADC countries, economic growth and development targets are set without
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necessarily considering SADC priorities. This undermines the effectiveness of the
RISDP. Besides, the priorities set in the RISDP will, undoubtedly, be affected by
the proposed TFTA. However, if implemented as planned, the TFTA could
stimulate growth in SADC, because of the expanded market and the harmony of
interests in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
When we look at the pooled and panel results, the study confirms the view
that improvements in human capital have a positive and significant impact on
growth. These findings are similar to those of other researchers who have either
used cross section analysis which included most of the SADC countries or case
studies on SADC member countries only. It can evidently be argued that, when
circumstances are conducive, human capital stimulates growth, but in adverse
conditions, it slows down the recession. The results of this study consistently
suggest this to be the case in SADC. Therefore, human capital formation can be
a basis for deeper integration in SADC. The other factors are investment in
physical capital, exports, and infrastructure. 
It is very clear that in recent years, the SADC region has recorded positive
growth rates. The challenge, however, is how to sustain the growth rates and raise
them in the long-run. This is one area that could be examined by future research.
Furthermore, future growth analysis in SADC could employ other variables, such
as the internet as an infrastructure variable. 
Notes:
1. Results of the unit roots tests and Pedroni Panel cointegration test are available on request
from the corresponding author at mupimpi@ub.bw 
2. The Mercosur member countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.
3. The CAN member countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.
4. These are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique,
Tanzania and Zambia.
5. These are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
6. This comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
7. These are Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland.
8. These are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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